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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-
2a-3(2)G) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Did Judge Memmott err in concluding that Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(2) 
authorized the District to charge for search and retrieval of the public records requested by 
Graham? 
2. Did Judge Memmott err in concluding that the District could refuse to permit 
Graham to inspect the requested records without prior payment of the "compilation" fee? 
3. If Graham substantially prevails in this action, is an award of attorneys' fees 
and other litigation costs appropriate? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal involve questions of statutory construction. 
Because it is the role of an "appellate court to define what the law is, and because the 
operation of statutes must be uniform throughout the state," the District Court's ruling on 
matters of statutory construction are accorded no deference and are reviewed for correctness. 
Mariemont Corp. v. White City Water Improvement DisU 958 P.2d 222, 223 (Utah 1998). 
Furthermore, when reviewing a District Court's grant of summary judgment, the court 
must "view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable 
[grahani\bnef klm] 1 
to the nonmoving party." V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 949 P.2d 906, 916 (Utah 
1997). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following statutory provisions of Utah's Government Records Access and 
Management Act ("GRAMA") are determinative in this appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-102 (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-201 (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203 (1997) 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-802 (1997) 
The foregoing statutory provisions are included in the Addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to Utah's Government Records Access and Management Act, Mark Graham 
seeks access to public records which the Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy 
Recovery Special Service District refuses to disclose without prior payment of a "compilation" 
fee. This is an appeal from the Honorable Jon M. Memmott's Ruling granting summary 
judgment in favor of the District. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Appellant Mark Graham ("Graham") is a resident of Layton, Utah who for several 
years has been active in monitoring and improving air quality in Davis County. (R. at 130.) 
[graham\bnc! klm] 2 
Graham is a member of the Residents of Davis County Clear Air Committee ("Committee"), a 
loosely-structured, non-profit organization made up of citizens interested in minimizing air 
pollution in Davis County. (R. at 130.) In particular. Graham and other members of the 
Committee have monitored the activities of the Davis County Solid Waste Management and 
Energy Recovery Special Service District ("the District"), a taxpayer-supported special service 
district that operates a solid-waste incinerator in Davis County. (R. at 130.) 
As a political subdivision of the State of Utah and a governmental entity pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-103(9), the District is subject to the provisions of Utah's Government 
Records Access and Management Act ("GRAMA"). (R. at 245.) On April 28. 1997. Graham 
filed a written GRAMA request with the District requesting access to records relating to 
government-mandated stack tests performed by the District in February and April 1997. (R. 
at 23.) Because Graham intended to use the materials for educational purposes, he requested 
that the District provide copies of the records free of charge pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
63-2-203(4)(a) (1997). 
On May 7, 1997, the District responded to the GRAMA request in a letter addressed to 
Graham personally. (R. at 24.) The letter, signed by District Director LeGrand Bitter 
("Bitter"), stated that a copy of the District's current contract with Rigo and Rigo Associates 
that Graham requested would be available after payment of $2.00 for copying costs. (R. at 
24.) Bitter advised Graham, however, that because the remaining documents requested 
amounted to several hundred pages, "copies will not be made until further request is made by 
you." (R. at 24.) Bitter also indicated that "[s]taff time and overhead will be billed at $20.00 
[graluni\brief klmj 3 
per hour for compilation of the documents and for a staff member to be present during your 
review." (R. at 24.) 
On May 19, 1997, under protest and reservation of rights, Graham sent the District 
$2.00 to pay for the photocopy of the District's contract with Rigo and Rigo Associates. (R. 
at 25.) In a subsequent letter to the District on May 22, 1997, Graham insisted that "the 
District has no statutory authority to charge me the $20 per hour mentioned in your letter." 
(R. at 26.) Graham requested that he be allowed access to the records free of charge and 
asked the District to set a date for inspection between May 27 and June 10, 1997, but 
excluding June 4. (R. at 26.) 
On May 29, 1997, the District sent Graham a copy of the Rigo and Rigo contract. (R. 
at 27.) The enclosed letter indicated that the additional documents requested would be 
available to review in the District offices on June 10 but that the District intended to bill 
Graham "for the staff time incurred in filling your request/* (R. at 27.) The following week, 
Graham received another letter dated June 4, 1997 indicating that the documents he had 
requested had been compiled but that he would not be allowed to view the records until he 
paid $280.00 incurred by the District in staff time and overhead. (R. at 28.) 
On June 9, 1997, pursuant to District Ordinance 92-C, Graham appealed the District's 
$280.00 charge for producing the records contained in his GRAMA request. (R. at 29-31.) 
The letter of appeal was signed by Graham and made no reference to the Committee. (R. at 
29-31.) Bitter denied Graham's appeal on June 24, 1997. (R. at 34.) 
On July 2, 1997, Graham appeared before the District's Administrative Review Board 
("Board") to appeal Bitter's decision. (R. at 247.) The Board voted to deny Graham's appeal 
[graham bnci klm] 4 
immediateh following the meeting. (R. at 247.) The next day, the Board mailed a written 
denial of appeal addressed to Graham personally. (R. at 247.) 
C. Course of Proceedings 
Graham, acting pro se, filed a complaint in the Second Judicial District for Davis 
County on July 30, 1997 seeking judicial review of the Board's decision to deny his appeal. 
(R. at 1-6.) Graham sought declaratory and injunctive relief declaring that the District's 
refusal to allow inspection or copying of the requested records without prior payment of 
$280.00 was unlawful, that the District be ordered to make the requested records available for 
inspection by Graham free of charge, and that the District be ordered to pa> Graham's 
litigation costs incurred in prosecuting this action. (R. at 1-6.) The Complaint was brought 
in the name of the Committee but was filed by Graham appearing pro se. (R. at 1-6.) 
The District's Answer on August 25, 1997 alerted Graham to the fact that Graham, not 
the Committee, was the proper party plaintiff. (R. at 35-40.) On September 19, 1997, soon 
after this pleading error was brought to his attention, Graham filed a Motion to File an 
Amended Complaint substituting Graham as plaintiff in place of the Committee. (R. at 114-
15.) 
In response, the District filed a Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment on 
October 3, 1997 arguing that the Committee was not a proper party plaintiiT and opposing the 
substitution of Graham for the Committee. (R. at 46-48.) That same day, mistakenly 
believing that the matter had been properly submitted for decision, Judge Jon M. Memmott of 
the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County issued an Order Granting Leave to File 
fgrahdm\bncf klm] 5 
Amended Complaint. (R. at 125.) Because the matter was not ripe for decision on October 
3, the trial court later withdrew this order. (R. at 152.) 
On November 18, 1997, after the motions were full) briefed, the trial court denied the 
District's Motion to Dismiss and granted Graham's Motion to Amend. (R. at 144-52.) The 
trial court ruled that Graham's timely request to amend the complaint when notified that he 
could not represent the Committee pro se argued against dismissal of the case. (R. at 144-
52.) Furthermore, the trial court held that Graham should be allowed to amend the complaint 
under Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) and that the identity of interest between Graham 
and the Committee allowed the amendment to relate back to the date of filing. (R. at 144-
52.) 
On January 16, 1998, Graham filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking the trial 
court's determination, as a matter of law. that the District's refusal to permit inspection or 
cop\ing of the requested records without prior payment of the $280.00 "compilation'* fee was 
unlawful under GRAMA. (R. at 159.) The District opposed Graham's motion and filed a 
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment seeking judgment in its favor. (R. at 174-76.) On 
April 6, 1998, the trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that GRAMA permitted the District to 
charge Graham $280.00 for compiling the requested records and accordingly granted summary 
judgment in favor of the District. (R. at 245-54.) On May 5, 1998, Graham, through 
counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial court's Ruling. (R. at 258-60.) 
On May 18, 1998, the District filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal of the portion of the 
trial court's April 6, 1998 Ruling denying the District attorneys' fees and the trial court's 
[graham hncf.klm] 6 
November 18, 1997 Order granting Graham's Motion to Amend the Complaint and denying 
the District's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment. (R. at 272-73.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District's imposition of a $280.00 "compilation" fee, representing the cost of staff 
time expended in searching for and retrieving records responsive to Graham's request, violates 
GRAMA because Graham did not request the District to compile a record in a different form 
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann § 63-2-203(2) (1997). The plain language of § 63-2-
203(2) limits charges for staff time to those instances where an individual has requested a 
governmental entity to provide a record in a particular format other than the form in which 
the governmental entity normally maintains the record. The legislative history of GRAMA's 
1994 fee amendments confirms that § 63-2-203(2) was only intended to apply when the 
government agency changes or modifies the form in which the record is maintained in 
response to a specific request. Furthermore, GRAMA's purpose of promoting open 
government would be frustrated if governmental agencies were allowed to charge substantial 
search and retrieval fees as a condition of access to public records. Because Graham's request 
merely sought access to existing District records in their existing format, the District was not 
entitled to impose the $280.00 compilation fee as a condition of access. 
Even if § 63-2-203(2) is construed to permit the District to charge a ^compilation"* fee 
to provide copies of the subject records, the District is not permitted to charge Graham a fee 
for merely inspecting the records. GRAMA expressly forbids governmental entities from 
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assessing fees against individuals wishing to inspect public records. Furthermore, GRAMA's 
prohibition on inspection fees is not subject to the compiling fee provisions of § 63-2-203. 
If Graham substantially prevails in this action, the Court should award Graham his 
attorneys' fees and costs incurred, as provided by GRAMA, as a result of the District's 
wrongful refusal to allow Graham to inspect the District's public records without paying the 
$280.00 compilation fee. An award of attorneys' fees is particularly appropriate in this case 
because Graham's original GRAMA request and his pursuit of this appeal are in the public 
interest. 
ARGUMENT 
I. UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. 63-2-203(2), THE DISTRICT MAY NOT CHARGE 
GRAHAM FOR THE COST OF STAFF TIME FOR SEARCH AND 
RETRIEVAL OF REQUESTED DOCUMENTS BECAUSE THE DISTRICT DID 
NOT COMPILE A RECORD IN A FORM DIFFERENT FROM THAT 
NORMALLY MAINTAINED BY THE DISTRICT. 
The District's charge of $280.00 for the staff time required to respond to Graham's 
records request was unlawful under GRAMA because Graham did not request that the District 
compile a record in a different form within the meaning of § 63-2-203(2). The starting place 
for construing a statute is its plain language. See V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
942 P.2d 906, 916-17 (Utah 1997). When the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, 
the court may then "seek guidance from the legislative history and relevant policy 
considerations." ]cL The plain language, legislative history, and public policies underlying 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(2) each support the conclusion that governmental entities may not 
charge for staff time required to fulfill a GRAMA request for existing public records in their 
existing format. 
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A* Plain Language 
Under the plain language of § 63-2-203(2), the District was not permitted to charge 
Graham for staff time when Graham did not request the records in a form other than that 
normally maintained by the District. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that "when faced 
with a question of statutory construction, we look first to the plain language of the statute." 
CIG Exploration, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 897 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 1995).1 
Under the plain language of § 63-2-203(2), the District may not charge Graham for 
staff time involved in search and retrieval of the requested records because Graham did not 
request that the District compile these records in a form not used by the District. Section 63-
2-203(2) allows governmental entities to charge for staff time involved in complying with a 
records request only when a requester has asked the entity to provide a record in a form 
different than that in which the governmental entity normally maintains the record. The 
relevant portion of GRAMA"s fee section provides: 
(2) When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form other than that 
normally maintained by the governmental entity, the actual costs under this section 
may include the following: 
(a) the cost of staff time for summarizing, compiling, or tailoring the record 
either into an organization or media to meet the person's request; 
(b) the cost of staff time for search, retrieval, and other direct administrative 
costs of complying with the request. . . . 
1
 When interpreting provisions of state open records acts similar to GRAMA, courts have 
narrowly construed any provisions restricting access to public records. See, e.g., McFrueal 
Rental v. Garr, 418 S.E.2d 60, 61 (Ga. 1992) ("By its nature, any fee imposed pursuant to 
[the fee provisions of the Open Records Act] constitutes a burden on the public's right of 
access to public records. Therefore, the statute must be narrowly construed."). 
(grdham\hricf klmj 9 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(2) (1997) (emphasis added). The government entity's authority 
to charge for the costs listed in subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b) is expressly conditioned by the 
clause: "When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form other than that normall) 
maintained by a governmental entity." The plain reading of this provision is that the staff 
time required to fulfill a records request cannot be charged to the requester except in those 
circumstances when this express condition is satisfied. In this case, because Graham did not 
request that the District compile the requested records in a form not used by the District, the 
District was not permitted to charge Graham for the staff time used to search for and retrieve 
the records.2 
This reading of § 63-2-203(2) is further supported by complementary provisions of 
GRAMA. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that when "doubt or uncertainty exists as to 
the meaning or application of an act's provisions, the court should analyze the act in its 
entirety and 'harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose.'" 
Benvon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 1743, 854 P.2d 513, 518 (Utah 1993) (quoting Osuala v. 
Aetna Life & Casualty, 608 P.2d 242, 243 (Utah 1980)). When interpreting GRAMA's fee 
provisions, it is particularly helpful to read § 63-2-203(2) in conjunction with § 63-2-201(8). 
Section 63-2-201(8) provides in relevant part: 
(b) Upon request a governmental entity shall provide a record in a particular format 
if: 
(i) the governmental entity is able to do so without unreasonably interfering 
with the governmental entity's duties and responsibilities; and 
2
 Furthermore, the Legislature's choice of the phrase ""compiling a record" indicates that it 
did not intend this section to apply to the act of retrieving and gathering multiple records 
together in response to a GRAMA request. Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(2) (1997) (emphasis 
added). 
fgrahanAbncf klm] 10 
(ii) the requester agrees to pay the governmental entity for its costs incurred 
in providing the record in its requested format in accordance with Section 63-2-
203. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-20l(8)(b) (1997). Section 63-2-201(8) informs requesters that they 
have the right to request records in a different format if they are willing to pay the costs 
incurred in accordance with § 63-2-203. Section 63-2-203 then specifies the fees the 
government can charge for performing this service "to meet the person's request." Thus, 
when viewed in the context of the entire act, GRAMA's provision allowing for "compiling" 
lees is understood to be limited to those exceptional situations where the requester has asked 
the entity to perform work beyond what is involved in responding to a routine records 
requests. In this case, Graham did not request that the District provide a record in a particular 
format nor did he request that the District summarize, transform, or manipulate the 
information in any way.3 Instead, Graham simply requested access to existing District 
records in their existing form. GRAMA does not allow entities to charge for staff time in 
fulfilling such routine requests. 
In interpreting the language of § 63-2-203(2), the trial court erred by failing to give 
the conditional clause in subsection (2) any meaning independent of the following subordinate 
clauses. The Utah Supreme Court has counseled that when analyzing the plain language of 
the statute, "we must attempt to give each part of the provision a relevant and independent 
3
 The fact that some of the records may have been stored electronically in computer format 
does not assist the District's position. At no time did Graham ask the District to manipulate, 
transform or convert the computer data to another format. Moreover, the District "may not 
use the physical form, electronic or otherwise, in which a record is stored to deny, or 
unreasonably hinder the rights of persons to inspect and receive copies of a record under 
[GRAMA]." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-201 (1997). 
[grulijm\hricf klm] 11 
meaning so as to give effect to all its terms/' In re Worthen. 926 P.2d 853. 866 (Utah 1996). 
The trial court misconstrued § 63-2-203(2) by defining the qualifying phrase "compiles a 
record in a form other than that normally maintained by the governmental entity" by reference 
to the type of work that may be billed to the requester if the condition is fulfilled. The trial 
court found that "any of the tasks listed at 63-2-203(a) through (c) must, by necessity, be 
encompassed within the term compile." (R. at 252.) However, if the Legislature intended to 
allow for staff time charges whenever the governmental entity performed any of the tasks 
listed in Subsections (2)(a) through (c), there would be no need for the qualifying language at 
the outset of Subsection (2). If the trial court's reading is accepted, the conditional clause at 
the beginning of the section would be rendered mere surplusage. Thus, the trial court's 
interpretation of the statute ignores the fundamental tenet of statutory construction that the 
independent meaning of each provision must be given effect. 
The plain language of § 63-2-203(2) limits its application to extraordinary records 
requests in which the requester asks the governmental entity to provide the information in a 
customized format. The District and the trial court erred in applying this section to Graham's 
routine records request.4 
B. Legislative History 
The legislative history of GRAMA's 1994 fee amendments indicate that § 63-2-203(2) 
was only intended to apply when the governmental agency modified the form of a record in 
4
 Ordinance No. 92-C, adopted by the District pursuant to GRAMA, permits the District 
to charge Graham 25 cents per page for each page of public records Graham requests to be 
photocopied. (R. at 101.) To be lawful under GRAMA, the 25 cents per page fee must 
reflect the District's "actual costs of duplicating a record," Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(1) 
(1997). 
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response to a specific request. Under accepted rules of statutory construction, "we need not 
look beyond the plain language of this provision unless we find some ambiguity in it. . . . If 
we find the provision ambiguous, however, we then seek guidance from the legislative history 
and relevant policy considerations." V-l Oil Co. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 942 P.2d 906, 
916-17 (Utah 1997). Although Graham believes the statutory language is clear on its face, 
the legislative history of GRAMA's 1994 fee amendments further supports the conclusion that 
the District may not lawfully impose the $280.00 "compilation" fee as a condition of access to 
these public records. 
The Senate floor debates concerning the 1994 amendments, which added the current 
language regarding compilation fees, confirm that the language used in 63-3-203(2) was 
meant to apply to situations where the record is "changed" in some way by the government 
entity. In introducing the proposed amendment to GRAMA's fee provisions, the sponsor of 
the bill. Senator David Steele, provided the following summary: 
Now this new section 2: "When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form 
other than that normally maintained by the governmental entity/' So if we've made a 
change—it's not just the exact same form, we've asked them to modify that forw—then 
this is what that section deals with. And it simply outlines that the cost of staff time 
for research could be incurred." 
Senator Steele, sponsor of SB 147, 50th Utah Legislature, Feb. 9, 1994, senate tape 21, line 
3405 (emphasis added) (appendix A, page 2, lines 9-14). Senator Steele's explanation makes 
clear that Subsection (2) was only intended to deal with situations where the requester asked 
the governmental agency to make a change or to modify the existing form of the record. In 
this case, Graham did not request that the District make any changes to the form of the 
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record. Because Graham merely requested access to the District's records in their existing 
form, the charges allowed in Subsection (2) cannot lawfully be imposed. 
In addition, the legislative history indicates that the fee amendments were modeled 
after a Colorado statute which clearly provides for fees only when data has been manipulated 
to produce a record in a form not used by the agency. When introducing the bill, Senator 
Steele indicated that language used in the amendments was drawn from the Colorado statute 
and that the Colorado statute had been examined and discussed in committee when 
considering the amendments. See Senator Steele, sponsor o( SB 147, 50th Utah Legislature. 
Feb. 9, 1994, senate tape 21, line 3405 (appendix A, pg. 3.. lines 25-27). The analogous fee 
provisions of the Colorado statute read: 
If, in response to a specific request, the state or any of its agencies, institutions or 
political subdivisions has performed a manipulation of data so as to generate a record 
in a form not used by the state or by said agency, institution or political subdivision, a 
reasonable fee may be charged to the person making the request. Such fee shall not 
exceed the actual cost of manipulating the said data and generating the said record in 
accordance with the request. 
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 24-72-205(3) (1997) (emphasis added). GRAMA"s provisions are 
closely parallel to this Colorado statute. Specifically, § 63-2-201 (8)(b) instructs governmental 
entities that they may provide a record in a particular format "upon request" and § 63-2-
203(2) allows the governmental entity to recoup its actual costs "[w]hen [itj compiles a record 
in a form other than that normally maintained." 
The meaning of ''compiles a record in a form other than that normally maintained" can 
be ascertained by reference to the corresponding language in the Colorado statute which was 
used as a model for GRAMA's 1994 fee amendments. Instead of the word "'compiles," the 
Colorado statute uses the phrase "manipulation of data." If GRAMA's fee provision was 
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intended to have a similar meaning as Colorado's statute, the word "compiles" must be read 
to mean something more than retrie\ing requested documents from multiple sources. The 
phrase "manipulation of data" instead suggests that the entitx has been asked to perform a task 
which generates a new record with an increased value to the requester beyond that of the raw 
information contained in the existing records. Here, no such work was requested by Graham 
or performed by the District in response to his GRAMA request. Like the additional fees 
provided in the model Colorado statute, the charges in § 63-2-203(2) were not intended to 
apply to requests for access to existing records, such as Graham's. 
C. Underlying Policy Considerations 
Because conditioning access to public records upon payment of substantial fees will 
undoubtedly chill exercise of the public's constitutional right of access, this Court should limit 
the application of § 63-2-203(2) to those exceptional circumstances under which the provision 
most clearly applies. The public's right of access to government records is a right of 
constitutional dimension. In Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980), the 
United States Supreme Court observed that the First Amendment was primarily intended to 
protect public debate essential to self-government, and because "meaningful self-government 
requires an informed electorate, . . . where the representative government itself maintains 
control of information essential to such an informed public discourse, the government may be 
affirmatively required to provide that information to the public." Eugene Cerruti, Dancing in 
the Courthouse: The First Amendment Right of Access Opens a New Round, 29 U. Rich. L. 
Rev. 237, 239 (1995); see also Society of Professional Journalists v. Briggs, 675 F.Supp. 
1308, 1310 (D. Utah 1987) (recognizing First Amendment right of access to public records). 
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The public's right of access implicit in the First Amendment must be closely guarded to 
protect the unrestricted How of information necessary for self-government. 
In drafting Utah's open records act, the Utah Legislature expressly recognized the 
public's ""constitutional right[] . . . of access to information concerning the conduct of the 
public's business." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-102(1) (1997). In drafting GRAMA's provisions, 
the Utah Legislature intended to "'promote the public's right of easy and reasonable access to 
unrestricted public records." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-102 (3)(a). The Act permits limitations 
on the public's right of access only as expressly provided by statute when the "public interest 
in allowing restrictions on access to records may outweigh the public's interest in access." 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-102(3)(b), -201(2) (1997). 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized "that it is the policy of this state that public 
records be kept open for public inspection in order to prevent secrecy in public affairs." 
KUTV. Inc. v. Utah State Bd. of Educ, 689 P.2d 1357, 1361 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted): 
see also Rathmann v. Davenport Community Sch. DisU 1998 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 137, *11-12 
(Iowa July 1, 1998) (holding that purpose of state open records acts is "'to open the doors of 
government to public scrutiny-to prevent government from secreting its decision-making 
activities from the public, on whose behalf it is its duty to act*"). Because the purpose and 
intention of state open records acts is "to further the concept of open government, . . . 
charges for public records must be kept to a minimum . . . so as to maximize access thereto." 
Shult/ v. New York Board of Elections, 633 N.Y.S.2d 915, 922 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995). 
A government body's unauthorized imposition of fees as a condition of access to 
public records is just as harmful to the public interest in open government as an outright 
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denial of access to such records. Government agencies should not be permitted to use 
GRAMA's fee provisions as a mechanism to hinder access to public records, or make it 
difficult or impossible for those who monitor or are critical of the agency to access agency 
information. See State of Hawai'i Org, of Police Officers v. Society of Professional 
Journalists, 927 P.2d 386, 400-01 (Haw. 1996). 
The statute's plain language, its legislative history, and public policy considerations all 
favor a construction of § 63-2-203(2) that allows charges for staff time onh when an 
indi\ idual requests that the governmental entity provide the records in a custom format. 
Because Graham requested access to the District's records in their existing format, the Court 
should hold that § 63-2-203(2) does not apply to the facts of this case and that the District 
may not charge Graham $280.00 as a condition of access. 
II. BECAUSE GRAMA DIRECTS GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES TO ALLOW 
INSPECTION OF PUBLIC RECORDS FREE OF CHARGE, THE DISTRICT'S 
REFUSAL TO PERMIT GRAHAM TO INSPECT THE RECORDS WITHOUT 
PRE-PAYMENT OF THE "COMPILATION" FEE WAS UNLAWFUL. 
Even if the District is permitted to charge a "compilation" fee under § 63-2-203 to 
recover its actual costs to provide copies of the subject records to Graham, the District is not 
permitted to charge Graham for merely inspecting the records. GRAMA expressly provides 
that a governmental entity may not charge a fee for allowing an individual to inspect public 
records. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-201(1), -203(5) (1997). There is no exception to this 
statutory proscription. Subsection (5) of § 63-2-203 reads as follows: 
(5) A governmental entity may not charge a fee for: 
(a) reviewing a record to determine whether it is subject to disclosure, except 
as permitted by Subsection (2)(b); or 
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(b) inspecting a record. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203 (1997) (emphasis added). Unlike subsection (5)(a), subsection 
(5)(b), which prohibits fees for inspecting a record, is not subject to the fee provisions of 
subsection (2)(b). GRAMA's mandate that the public be allowed to inspect public records 
free of charge is express, absolute, and not subject to the ''compilation" fees provided in 
subsection (2)(b). 
The Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of that state's fee statute is helpful in 
understanding the effect of GRAMA's free inspection provisions on its compilation fee 
provisions. Like GRAMA, Minnesota's open records statute prohibits fees for inspection of 
public records yet separately allows an agency to charge for search, retrieval, and compilation 
of information in certain limited circumstances. See Minn. Stat. § 13.03(3) (1990). Noting 
that the "purpose of this provision is to prevent the assessment of fees for mere requests to 
inspect public data," the Minnesota Supreme Court held that "[n]o charge may be assessed for 
access to or inspection of public data or for the cost of retrieving and compiling documents 
for inspection." Demers v. City of Minneapolis, 468 N.W.2d 71, 75 (Minn. 1991). 
Like the Minnesota statute, GRAMA prohibits fees for inspection of public records but 
allows agencies to charge for search, retrieval and compilation of records in certain 
circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-203(2) & (5) (1997). However, the compilation 
fee provisions must not be interpreted in a way that would defeat the Legislature's clearly 
expressed and unqualified intention that the public be permitted to inspect records free of 
charge. Instead, because there is no indication in the act that the Legislature intended to limit 
or condition the public's statutory right to inspect government records free of charge, this 
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Court should hold that the District wrongfully prevented Graham from inspecting the 
District's records based on non-payment of the "compilation" fee. 
III. PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-2-802, THIS COURT SHOULD 
AWARD GRAHAM REASONABLE ATTORNEYS' FEES AND COSTS 
INCURRED IN PURSUING THIS APPEAL BECAUSE THE DISTRICT 
WRONGFULLY DENIED ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS WHICH 
GRAHAM HAD A RIGHT TO INSPECT. 
Because the District withheld access to public records in violation of GRAMA, 
Graham is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in appealing the District's 
decision. GRAMA's applicable provisions on attorneys' fees read in relevant part: 
(2)(a) A district court may assess against any go\ernmental entity or political 
subdivision reasonable attorneys' fees and other litigation costs reasonable incurred in 
connection with a judicial appeal of a denial of a records request if the requester 
substantially prevails. 
(b) In determining whether to award attorneys' ices under this section, the court 
shall consider: 
(i) the public benefit derived from the case: 
(ii) the nature of the requester's interest in the records; and 
(iii) whether the governmental entity's or political subdivision's actions had a 
reasonable basis. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-802(2) (1997). If Graham substantially prevails on the merits of this 
appeal, the three considerations outlined in § 63-2-802 support awarding Graham attorneys' 
fees. 
First, if Graham prevails, the public benefit derived from this case will be significant. 
By pursuing this appeal, Graham may succeed in preventing governmental entities from 
effectively denying public access to government records by charging excessive fees. 
Second, Graham requested the District's records to advance the public's collective 
interest in promoting clean air and minimizing sources of air pollution, not for any 
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commercial purpose. As a clean-air activist and member of a watchdog group on air 
pollution. Graham requested the records as part of an on-going effort to monitor the District's 
acthities to ensure that it was acting in accordance with the law and the best interests o( the 
public. Records requests for the purpose of educating the public about the activities of the 
government in order to effect political change further the essential purpose of the open 
records act: to facilitate informed public discourse essential to self-government. 
Third, government agencies should be discouraged from imposing unauthorized and 
excessive fees as a condition of access to public records, particularly where, as here, the 
requester is a citizen watchdog and critic of the agency. Moreover, Graham put the District 
on notice from the start that it could not lawfully levy the ^compilation" fee as a condition of 
access to the records. Graham pointed out the specific statutory provisions of GRAMA that 
allowed him to inspect the records free of charge and which precluded the District from 
levying its punitive "compilation" fee. In the face of such notice and the clear language oi^ 
the statute, the District persisted in defending its position through two administrative hearings 
and proceedings in the trial court, during which Graham represented himself pro se. In light 
of such facts and the public interests at stake, the District's actions were not reasonable and 
an award of attorneys" fees in this case is proper and just. 
Because Graham's original GRAMA request and his pursuit of this appeal are in the 
public interest, Graham is entitled to attorneys' fees incurred as a result of the District's 
unlawful refusal to allow Graham to inspect or copy the requested records without prepayment 
of the ^compilation" fee. 
[giahdmvhncf klm| 20 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons. Graham respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trial 
court's entry of summary judgment in favor ot the District, issue an order permitting Graham 
to inspect the requested records free of charge, and award Graham his reasonable attorneys' 
fees and costs incurred in this appeal. 
DATED this ]M_ day of September, 1998. 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Jeffre)VlJ. Hunt 
vAttorney<Kor PLkMtiff/AWellant Mark Graham 
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IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF D/foflS §01^15^ PH f 98 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARK GRAHAM, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
DAVIS COUNTY SOLID WASTE 
MANAGEMENT AND ENERGY 
RECOVERY SPECIAL SERVICE 
DISTRICT, THE DISTRICT'S 
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL BOARD, 
and LeGRAND BITTER, THE DISTRICT'S 
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 
Defendants. 
«v . V W ^ 
c : L i • . ", 
RULING ON PLAINTIFF'S AND 
DEFENDANTS' CROSS MOTIONS 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 970700320 
The matters of plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and defendants' cross-motion for 
summary judgment come before the Court for decision on the parties' respective notices to 
submit. The Court has reviewed both parties' pleadings and other submitted materials, as well as 
the applicable law. Having done so, and now being fully advised, it is the Court's conclusion that 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment should be denied and defendants' motion for summary 
judgment should be granted. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds no dispute as to the following relevant material facts:1 
1. That defendant Davis County Solid Waste Management and Energy Recovery 
Special Service District ("District") is a political subdivision of the State of Utah and a 
"governmental entity" pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-2-103(9); 
1
 The Court has taken the following facts from the parties' memoranda in support and opposition of 
their respective motions. Plaintiffs facts are not supported by any reference to the record, but as defendant raises 
no objection and does not dispute such facts, the Courtwill allow them. Plaintiff disputes several of defendant's 
(properly supported) facts, but only on legal grounds which the Court dismisses and as to their relevancy, not their 
truthfulness or accuracy. Furthermore, plaintiff provides "ho reference to any record which would put their 
truthfulness at issue. 
2. That defendant Administrative Control Board ("Board") is the governing body of 
the district, and has the legal authority to make determinations regarding public access to records 
in the district's offices and agencies. The Board is also a "governmental entity" pursuant to 
'U.C.A. §63-2-103(9); 
3. That defendant Bitter is and was at also times relevant to this action the executive 
director of the District. The Executive Director's office is a "governmental entity" pursuant to 
U.C.A. § 63-2-103(9); 
4. That in February and April of 1997, the District performed initial compliance 
testing as required by condition no. 8 of the Approval Order Number DAQE-850-96 dated 
September 10, 1996 ("Approval Order") issued by the State of Utah Department of 
Environmental Quality, Division of Air Quality; 
5. That on April 28, 1997 plaintiff submitted a written request to the District 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-2-101 et seq. of the Utah Government Records access and Management 
Act ("GRAMA") for the right to inspect as well as copy certain governmental records 
concerning the 1997 stack tests; 
6. That the written request asked for: 
1. The current contract(s) between the Special Service District and Dr. H. Gregor Rigo 
and/or his firm, Rigo & Rigo Associates; 
2. Records relating to the stack test(s) conducted during January and/or February, 1997, 
namely: 
a. samples taken, journals, personal field notes, and inspection logs; 
b. laboratory analysis of air samples taken; 
c. any correspondence between the District and the entities responsible for 
gathering and/or analyzing and evaluating the air samples subsequent to the date of 
sampling; 
d. memos or internal documents (within the Special Service District) relating 
to the stack test or the laboratory analysis; 
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e. any deviation or departure from the prescribed methods for gathering-
samples and their reason(s), or problems encountered during the sample gathering 
process. 
7. That on May 7, 1997 the District responded to plaintiff in writing. The letter said, 
in relevant part, " . . . copies will not be made until further request is made by you," and went on 
to say, "Staff time and overhead will be billed at $20.00 per hour for compilation of the 
documents; 
8. That on May 22, 1997 plaintiff wrote to the District asking the District to set a 
date between May 27 and June 10 (but excluding June 4) for inspection of the requested 
government records; 
9. That on May 29, 1997 the District sent plaintiff some of the material requested, 
specifically, the District's contract with Rigo and Rigo Associates; 
10. That on June 4, 1997 the District responded in writing by stating its intention to 
cnarge the plaintiff $280.00 for staff time before allowing plaintiff to either inspect or copy the 
requested material; 
11. That on June 9, 1997 plaintiff appealed the District's denial to Bitter, the 
District's executive director, pursuant to the District's Ordinance 92-C, which is in accordance 
with GRAMA; 
12. That on June 24, 1997 Bitter responded in writing, denying the appeal; 
13. That on July 2, 1997 plaintiff appealed Bitter's decision to the Board at its 
monthly meeting; 
14. That on July 2, 1997 the Board voted to deny plaintiffs appeal, sending written 
notice of that vote the next day; 
15. That the District has never claimed that the government records requested by 
plaintiff are private, controlled or protected, or that plaintiff has no right to inspect such records; 
16. That this action was filed July 30, 1997; 
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17. That because of the variety of records involved in accommodating Mr. Graham's 
request, the District could not and did not store them in one document, computer program, or 
central file; 
18. That the District had to take files, documents, and data from several sources and 
organize them in order to respond to Mr. Graham's request; 
19. That the district made a thorough search of all files and records related to the 
testing to insure that the District produced everything relevant; 
20. That in order to do so, it was necessary for the District to contact those people 
who may have been involved in the testing at issue and obtain their assistance; 
21. That John Watson, Bart Baker, certain operators and maintenance personnel, and 
Jack Schmidt searched, retrieved, and compiled the records requested by Mr. Graham. 
Collectively, they spent a total of 14 hours; 
22. That the District retrieved and compiled information from District files located at 
individual employees' work stations, daytimers, operator logs, testing protocols, general District 
files that may relate to testing, and a computer database; 
23. That research on the computer database was a time-consuming process. The 
database is continually updated, and after a period of time, information stored in the database is 
downloaded to tape. Some of the information Mr. Graham requested had been stored on tape, 
requiring an operator to peruse the computer and tapes to locate and print hard copies of the 
information plaintiff requested; 
24. That the district assessed plaintiff a $280.00 fee based on the 14 hours actually 
expended for the several searches by the District staff; 
25. That in compliance with GRAMA and the Ordinance, plaintiff will not be charged 
for time incurred in reviewing the records to determine whether they were private, controlled or 
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protected under GRAMA, although a review of the records requested by plaintiff was made to 
make such a determination; 
26. That staff time charges assessed by the District on plaintiffs records request were 
based on the Ordinance, but were less than actual cost because employees who reviewed the files 
are paid more than $20.00 per hour; 
27. That recently, the District was charged $25.00 per hour for staff time incurred by 
Hill Air Force Base in responding to Freedom of Information Act request by the District. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Before turning to the merits of the case, the Court notes the applicable standard of review. 
Summary judgment is appropriate "only when no genuine issue of material fact exists and the 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Bevnon v. St. George-Dixie Lodge # 
1743, 854 P.2d 513, 514-515 (Utah 1993): see also Alf v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co.. 850 P.2d 
1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). 
In considering a motion for summary judgement, the Court must examine the evidence in 
"a light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment." Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 
415 (Utah 1990). Allegations or denials in the pleadings are not a sufficient basis for opposing 
summary judgment, see Hall v. Fitzgerald. 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983), and when a motion for 
summary judgment is filed and supported by an affidavit or affidavits, the party opposing the 
motion has an affirmative duty to respond with affidavits or other materials allowed by Rule 
56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See D & L Supply v. SaurinL 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 
1989); Thavne v. Beneficial Utah Inc., 874 P.2d 120 (Utah 1994). Rule 4-501(2)(b) of the Utah 
Code of Judicial Administration states: 
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a section that 
contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the party contends a 
genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate numbered 
sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which 
the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or 
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sentences of the movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the 
movant's statement and properly supported bv an accurate reference to the record 
shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless 
specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement. 
(emphasis added) 
LEGAL ARGUMENTS AND RULING 
Upon competing motions for summary judgment, there appear to be few disputed facts 
between the parties. Plaintiff, in his reply memo, well characterizes the essential dispute 
between the parties as concerning the interpretation and application of GRAMA statutes, 
specifically U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2), to the facts of this case. U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2) reads as 
follows: 
(2) When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form other than that 
normally maintained by the governmental entity, the actual costs under this section 
may include the following: 
(a) the cost of staff time for summarizing, compiling, or tailoring the 
record either into an organization or media to meet the person's request; 
(b) the cost of staff time for search, retrieval, and other direct 
administrative costs for complying with a request. The hourly charge may not 
exceed the salary of the lowest paid employee who, in the discretion of the 
custodian of records, has the necessary skill and training to perform the 
request; provided, however, that no charge may be made for the first quarter 
hour of staff time; and 
(c) in the case of fees for a record that is the result of 
computer output other than word processing, the actual incremental 
cost of providing the electronic services and products together with 
a reasonable portion of the costs associated with formatting or 
interfacing the information for particular users, and the administrative 
costs as set forth in Subsections (2)(a) and (b). 
Defendants argue that the $280.00 fee they request is provided for by the statute. Plaintiff argues 
it is not. The parties are before the Court, requesting the Court resolve their dispute. 
Plaintiffs critical argument revolves around the meaning of the words "compile" and 
"form" and their context, in the phrase: "When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form 
other than that normally maintained by the governmental entity, the actual costs under this 
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section may include the following: [.]" Plaintiff argues that the meanings of "compile" and 
"form" are vague and ambiguous and as such must be construed as narrowly as possible, thereby 
excluding all charges for any records that are already maintained by the government agency, and 
only allowing charges for a record that is "transformed" into a different record. Defendants 
argue that the fees they are charging are allowable under the plain reading of the statute. 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressed guidelines on statutory construction as follows: 
The applicable principles of statutory construction are clear. "We look first to the 
plain language of the statute to discern the legislative intent 'Only when we find 
ambiguity in the statute's plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative 
history and relevant policy consideration."1 
City of South Salt Lake v. Salt Lake County. 925 P.2d 954, 957 (Utah 1996). Furthermore, 
Indeed, it is a "fundamental principle of statutory construction (and . . . of language 
itself) that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be 
drawn from the context in which it is used." 
State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311,313 (Utah 1995). Finally, "[w]e must assume that each term in the 
statute was used advisedly by the Legislature and that each should be interpreted and applied 
according to its usually accepted meaning." West Jordan v. Morrison. 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 
1982). 
In the Court's opinion, the statute is neither vague nor ambiguous, nor is it difficult to 
construct, given the plain meaning of its terms. Defendants provide that Webster's New World 
Dictionary defines "compile" as: "to gather and put together (statistics, facts, etc.) in an orderly 
form" and "to compose (a book, etc.) of materials gathered from various sources." Webster's 
defines "form," inter alia, as: "the particular mode of existence a thing has or takes;" 
"arrangement, esp. orderly arrangement; way in which parts of a whole are organized; pattern; 
style.. ."2 
2
 Webster's New World Dictionary, (2d ed. 1980) 290, and 548, respectively. By coincidence, the 
Court uses the same dictionary, and has reviewed these citations for accuracy. 
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Plaintiffs request consists of records falling into five separate categories (see, Court's 
Findings of Fact No. 6, a-e, supra). Defendants' unrebutted evidence, from the affidavit of John 
K. Schmidt submitted in support of their memorandum, shows that 14 hours of staff time was 
spent in responding to plaintiffs request (see, Court's Findings of Fact Nos. 17-23, supra). 
From the facts submitted it is quite clear to the Court that the requested fee was incurred as a 
direct result of the District's "summarizing, compiling [and] tailoring the record either into an 
organization or media to meet the person's request;" their "search, retrieval, and other direct 
administrative costs for complying with [the] request; and "the actual incremental cost of 
providing the electronic services and products together with a reasonable portion of the costs 
associated with formatting or interfacing the information for particular users, and the 
administrative costs as set forth in Subsections (2)(a) and (b)." [See U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2)(a)-(c).] 
Plaintiff argues that the District should have been able to respond to his requests by 
simply retrieving the records and presenting them to him, yet does not support these allegations 
by evidence acceptable under Rule 56, U.R.Civ.P.3 As made clear by defendants, the records 
were kept in neither the form nor the media requested by plaintiff and they therefore needed to be 
"compiled" into that form to conform to his requests. 
The Court finds that the common meaning of the terms "compile" and "form"would 
include the work performed by the District. As further support, the context of the words within 
the statute supports this conclusion. "Compile" is the only verb in U.C.A. § 63-2-203(2) 
defining what actual costs may be charged for. Therefore, as the same section goes on to state 
"the actual costs under this section may include the following...," any of the tasks listed at 63-2-
203(2)(a) through (c) must, by necessity, be encompassed within the term "compile." Any other 
3
 Plaintiffs comment with respect to the storage capacity of Iomega "Zip" data storage drives is 
neither supported by evidence, nor relevant. Defendants supported averment is that the data had to be pulled from 
several sources, and that old files were constantly being put on computer storage tapes, necessitating the time for 
perusing such files to find and copy the relevant requested material. 
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reading of the section would be nonsensical, and, in the Court's opinion, could only with great 
difficulty be seriously argued. 
Plaintiff does not dispute the actual number of staff hours worked nor the rate charged. 
As such, the Court would find both reasonable under the statute as well as in the Court's 
experience. In sum, the Court finds defendant's facts and arguments persuasive, and would 
award summary judgement in their favor. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing reasons, the Court rules that plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment is HEREBY DENIED. Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is „ 
HEREBY GRANTED. 
No attorneys' fees are awarded. 
Dated April In , 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
f§f srA7E \ t \ DISTRICT JUDGE 
% c£ 
V2> 
OF 
UTAH m 
9 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
& 
I certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling on April 
1998, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Mark Graham 
Plaintiff Pro Se 
2211 East 1200 North 
Layton,Utah 84040 
Larry S. Jenkins 
Susan J. Mueller 
Attorneys for Defendants 
500 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
E. Merrell 
lerk to the Honorable 
. Memmott 
10 
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 
63-2-101 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
Section 
63-2-802. 
63-2-803. 
63-2-804. 
Injunction — Attorneys' fees. 
No liability for certain decisions of 
a governmental entity or a po-
litical subdivision. 
Disciplinary action. 
Part 9 
Archives and Records Service 
Section 
63-2-903. 
63-2-904, 
63-2-905. 
63-2-906, 
63-2-907, 
63-2-908, 
63-2-901. Division of Archives and Records 
Service created — Duties. 
63-2-902. State archivist — Duties. 
63-2-909. 
Duties of governmental entities. 
Rulemaking authority. 
Records declared property of the 
state — Disposition. 
Certified and microphotographed 
copies. 
Right to replevin. 
Inspection and summary of record 
series. 
Records made public after 75 
years. 
P A R T I 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
63-2-101. Short title. 
This chapter is known as the "Government Records Access and Management 
Act." 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-101, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 259, § 8. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Governmental Law, 1992 Utah L. Rev. 375. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 66 Am. Jur. 2d Records and 
Recording Laws §§ 1, 2. 
C.J.S. — 76 C.J.S. Records §§ 1, 2. 
63-2-102. Legislative intent . 
A.L.R. — What constitutes "final opinion" or 
"order" of federal administrative agency re-
quired to be made available for public inspec-
tion and copying within meaning of 5 USCS 
§ 552(a)(2)(A), 114 A.L.R. Fed. 287. 
(1) In enacting this act, the Legislature recognizes two constitutional rights: 
(a) the public's right of access to information concerning the conduct of 
the public's business; and 
(b) the right of privacy in relation to personal data gathered by 
governmental entities. 
(2) The Legislature also recognizes a public policy interest in allowing a 
government to restrict access to certain records, as specified in this chapter, for 
the public good. 
(3) It is the intent of the Legislature to: 
(a) promote the public's right of easy and reasonable access to unre-
stricted public records; 
(b) specify those conditions under which the public interest in allowing 
restrictions on access to records may outweigh the public's interest in 
access; 
(c) prevent abuse of confidentiality by governmental entities by permit-
ting confidential treatment of records only as provided in this chapter; 
(d) provide guidelines for both disclosure and restrictions on access to 
government records, which are based on the equitable weighing of the 
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pertinent interests and which are consistent with nationwide standards of 
information practices; 
(e) favor public access when, in the application of this act, 
countervailing interests are of equal weight; and 
(f) establish fair and reasonable records management practices. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-102, enacted by L. act" means Laws 1991, ch. 259, which revised 
1991, ch. 259, § 9; 1992, ch. 280, § 14. this chapter; see "Revision of Chapter" note 
Meaning of "this act" — The phrase "this under the chapter heading. 
63-2-103. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Audit" means: 
(a) a systematic examination of financial, management, program, 
and related records for the purpose of determining the fair presenta-
tion of financial statements, adequacy of internal controls, or compli-
ance with laws and regulations; or 
(b) a systematic examination of program procedures and opera-
tions for the purpose of determining their effectiveness, economy, 
efficiency, and compliance with statutes and regulations. 
(2) "Chronological logs" mean the regular and customary summary 
records of law enforcement agencies and other public safety agencies that 
show the time and general nature of police, fire, and paramedic calls made 
to the agency and any arrests or jail bookings made by the agency. 
(3) "Classification," "classify," and their derivative forms mean deter-
mining whether a record series, record, or information within a record is 
public, private, controlled, protected, or exempt from disclosure under 
Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b). 
(4) (a) "Computer program" means a series of instructions or state-
ments that permit the functioning of a computer system in a manner 
designed to provide storage, retrieval, and manipulation of data from 
the computer system, and any associated documentation and source 
material that explain how to operate the computer program. 
(b) "Computer program" does not mean: 
(i) the original data, including numbers, text, voice, graphics, 
and images; 
(ii) analysis, compilation, and other manipulated forms of the 
original data produced by use of the program; or 
(iii) the mathematical or statistical formulas (excluding the 
underlying mathematical algorithms contained in the program) 
that would be used if the manipulated forms of the original data 
were to be produced manually. 
(5) (a) "Contractor" means: 
(i) any person who contracts with a governmental entity to 
provide goods or services directly to a governmental entity; or 
(ii) any private, nonprofit organization that receives funds 
from a governmental entity, 
(b) "Contractor" does not mean a private provider. 
(6) "Controlled record" means a record containing data on individuals 
that is controlled as provided by Section 63-2-303. 
(7) "Designation," "designate," and their derivative forms mean indicat-
ing, based on a governmental entity's familiarity with a record series or 
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available to the public within a reasonable public interest to prevent disclosure; in an 
time. While "reasonable time" might vary, it action to compel disclosure, district court 
would necessarily be before any important ac- should have held an in camera inspection of the 
• tion was to take place. Conover v. Board of questionnaire and permitted disclosure unless 
Educ, 1 Utah 2d 375, 267 P.2d 768 (1954). it specifically found, on basis of its inspection, 
<~ , that it would be impossible to edit the question-
—Survey quest ionnaire and responses. ±
 c i, ,. r . o v. i t JI i.- • naire responses to preserve confidentiality School board s survey questionnaire concern- ,, ,, r, ,
 r f . . , , 
,. . , . j j . . . . . , . and/or that release of documents in whole or in 
mg religious and racial discrimination at school ^ . , , , , ,
 x i_v • ^ 
and student resoonses thereto were "Dublic p a r t w o u l d b e c l e a r l y c o n t r a r y t o P u b h c i n t e r ' 
ana student responses tner o were puoiic . KUTV, Inc. v. Utah State Bd. of Educ, 689 
records and would be subject to inspection by ' ' ^ r ? nn\ i q o T *^*^., ^-^ 
an interested citizen unless they were confiden- * *' 
tial or of such a nature that it would be in 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Society of Pro- ential Balancing Test for the Right of Access, 
fessional Journalists v. Briggs: Ibward a Defer- 1989 Utah L. Rev. 787. 
63-2-104. Administrative Procedures Act not applicable* 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, does not apply to this 
chapter except as provided in Section 63-2-603. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-104, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 259, § 11; 1992, ch. 280, § 16. 
63-2-105. Confidentiality agreements . 
If a governmental entity or political subdivision receives a request for a 
record that is subject to a confidentiality agreement executed before April 1, 
1992, the law in effect at the time the agreement was executed, including late 
judicial interpretations of the law, shall govern access to the record, unless all 
parties to the confidentiality agreement agree in writing to be governed by the 
provisions of this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-105, enacted by L. 
1992, ch. 280, § 17. 
PART 2 
ACCESS TO RECORDS 
63-2-201. Right to inspect records and receive copies of 
records. 
(1) Every person has the right to inspect a public record free of charge, and 
the right to take a copy of a public record during normal working hours, subject 
to Sections 63-2-203 and 63-2-204. 
(2) All records are public unless otherwise expressly provided by statute. 
(3) The following records are not public: 
(a) records that are private, controlled, or protected under Sections 
63-2-302, 63-2-303, and 63-2-304; and 
(b) records to which access is restricted pursuant to court rule, another 
state statute, federal statute, or federal regulation, including records for 
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which access is governed or restricted as a condition of participation in a 
state or federal program or for receiving state or federal funds. 
(4) Only those records specified in Section 63-2-302, 63-2-303, or 63-2-304 
may be classified private, controlled, or protected. 
(5) (a) A governmental entity may not disclose a record that is private, 
controlled, or protected to any person except as provided in Subsection 
(5)(b), Section 63-2-202, or Section 63-2-206. 
(b) A governmental entity may disclose records that are private under 
Subsection 63-2-302(2) or protected under Section 63-2-304 to persons 
other than those specified in Section 63-2-202 or 63-2-206 if the head of a 
governmental entity, or a designee, determines that there is no interest in 
restricting access to the record, or that the interests favoring access 
outweighs the interest favoring restriction of access. 
(6) (a) The disclosure of records to which access is governed or limited 
pursuant to court rule, another state statute, federal statute, or federal 
regulation, including records for which access is governed or limited as a 
condition of participation in a state or federal program or for receiving 
state or federal funds, is governed by the specific provisions of that statute, 
rule, or regulation. 
(b) This chapter applies to records described in Subsection (a) insofar as 
this chapter is not inconsistent with the statute, rule, or regulation. 
(7) A governmental entity shall provide a person with a certified copy of a 
record if: 
(a) the person requesting the record has a right to inspect it; 
(b) the person identifies the record with reasonable specificity; and 
(c) the person pays the lawful fees. 
(8) (a) A governmental entity is not required to create a record in response 
to a request. 
(b) Upon request, a governmental entity shall provide a record in a 
particular format if: 
(i) the governmental entity is able to do so without unreasonably 
interfering with the governmental entity's duties and responsibilities; 
and 
(ii) the requester agrees to pay the governmental entity for its costs 
incurred in providing the record in the requested format in accordance 
with Section 63-2-203. 
(c) Nothing in this section requires a governmental entity to fulfill a 
person's records request if the request unreasonably duplicates prior 
records requests from that person. 
(9) If a person requests copies of more than 50 pages of records from a 
governmental entity, and, if the records are contained in files that do not 
contain records that are exempt from disclosure, the governmental entity may: 
(a) provide the requester with the facilities for copying the requested 
records and require that the requester make the copies himself; or 
(b) allow the requester to provide his own copying facilities and person-
nel to make the copies at the governmental entity's offices and waive the 
fees for copying the records. 
(10) (a) A governmental entity that owns an intellectual property right and 
that offers the intellectual property right for sale or license may control by 
ordinance or policy the duplication and distribution of the material based 
on terms the governmental entity considers to be in the public interest. 
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(b) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to limit or impair the 
rights or protections granted to the governmental entity under federal 
copyright or patent law as a result of its ownership of the intellectual 
property right. 
(11) A governmental entity may not use the physical form, electronic or 
otherwise, in which a record is stored to deny, or unreasonably hinder the 
rights of persons to inspect and receive copies of a record under this chapter. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-201, enacted by L. ment, effective May 2, 1994, added "in accor-
1991, ch. 259, § 12; 1992, ch. 280, § 18; 1994, dance with Section 63-2-203" at the end of 
ch. 194, § 1. Subsection (8)(b)(ii) and made stylistic changes. 
Amendment Notes, — The 1994 amend-
COLLATERAL REFERENCES. 
AJLR. — State freedom of information act 
requests: right to receive information in par-
ticular medium or format, 86 A.L.R.4th 786. 
63-2-202. Access to private, controlled, and protected 
documents. 
(1) Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a private record to: 
(a) the subject of the record; 
(b) the parent or legal guardian of an unemancipated minor who is the 
subject of the record; 
(c) the legal guardian of a legally incapacitated individual who is the 
subject of the record; 
(d) any other individual who: 
(i) has a power of attorney from the subject of the record; 
(ii) submits a notarized release from the subject of the record or his 
legal representative dated no more than 90 days before the date the 
request is made; or 
(hi) if the record is a medical record described in Subsection 
63-2-302(l)(b), is a health care provider, as defined in Subsection 
26-33a-102(7), if releasing the record or information in the record is 
consistent with normal professional practice and medical ethics; or 
(e) any person to whom the record must be provided pursuant to court 
order as provided in Subsection (7) or a legislative subpoena as provided in 
Title 36, Chapter 14. 
(2) (a) Upon request, a governmental entity shall disclose a controlled 
record to: 
(i) a physician, psychologist, certified social worker, insurance 
provider or agent, or a government public health agency upon sub-
mission of a release from the subject of the record that is dated no 
more than 90 days prior to the date the request is made and a signed 
acknowledgment of the terms of disclosure of controlled information 
as provided by Subsection (b); and 
(ii) any person to whom the record must be disclosed pursuant to 
court order as provided in Subsection (7) or a legislative subpoena as 
provided in Title 36, Chapter 14. 
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63-2-203. Fees. 
(1) A governmental entity may charge a reasonable fee to cover the 
governmental entity's actual cost of duplicating a record. This fee shall be 
approved by the governmental entity's executive officer. 
(2) When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form other than that 
normally maintained by the governmental entity, the actual costs under this 
section may include the following: 
(a) the cost of staff time for summarizing, compiling, or tailoring the 
record either into an organization or media to meet the person's request; 
(b) the cost of staff time for search, retrieval, and other direct admin-
istrative costs for complying with a request. The hourly charge may not 
exceed the salary of the lowest paid employee who, in the discretion of the 
custodian of records, has the necessary skill and training to perform the 
request; provided, however, that no charge may be made for the first 
quarter hour of staff time; and 
(c) in the case of fees for a record that is the result of computer output 
other than word processing, the actual incremental cost of providing the 
electronic services and products together with a reasonable portion of the 
costs associated with formatting or interfacing the information for par-
ticular users, and the administrative costs as set forth in Subsections 
(2)(a) and (b). 
(3) Fees shall be established as follows: 
(a) Governmental entities with fees established by the Legislature shall 
establish the fees defined in Subsection (2), or other actual costs associated 
with this section through the budget process. Governmental entities with 
fees established by the Legislature may use the procedures of Section 
63-38-3.2 to set fees until the Legislature establishes fees through the 
budget process, A fee set by a governmental entity in accordance with 
Section 63-38-3.2 expires on May 1, 1995. 
(b) Political subdivisions shall establish fees by ordinance or written 
formal policy adopted by the governing body. 
(c) The judiciary shall establish fees by rules of the judicial council. 
(4) A governmental entity may fulfill a record request without charge and is 
encouraged to do so when it determines that: 
(a) releasing the record primarily benefits the public rather than a 
person; 
(b) the individual requesting the record is the subject of the record, or 
an individual specified in Subsection 63-2-202(1) or (2); or 
(c) the requester's legal rights are directly implicated by the informa-
tion in the record, and the requester is impecunious. 
(5) A governmental entity may not charge a fee for: 
(a) reviewing a record to determine whether it is subject to disclosure, 
except as permitted by Subsection (2)(b); or 
(b) inspecting a record. 
(6) (a) A person who believes that there has been an unreasonable denial of 
a fee waiver under Subsection (4) may appeal the denial in the same 
manner as a person appeals when inspection of a public record is denied 
under Section 63-2-205. 
(b) The adjudicative body hearing the appeal has the same authority 
when a fee waiver or reduction is denied as it has when the inspection of 
a public record is denied. 
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(7) (a) All fees received under this section by a governmental entity subject 
to Subsection (3)(a) shall be retained by the governmental entity as a 
dedicated credit. 
(b) Those funds shall be used to recover the actual cost and expenses 
incurred by the governmental entity in providing the requested record or 
record series. 
(8) A governmental entity may require payment of past fees and future 
estimated fees before beginning to process a request if fees are expected to 
exceed $50, or if the requester has not paid fees from previous requests. Any 
prepaid amount in excess of fees due shall be returned to the requester. 
(9) This section does not alter, repeal, or reduce fees established by other 
statutes or legislative acts. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-203, enacted by L, accordingly; in Subsection (3)(a) substituted 
1991, ch. 259, § 14; 1992, ch. 280, § 20; 1994, "the fees defined in Subsection (2), or other 
ch. 194, § 2; 1995, ch. 20, § 114. actual costs associated with this section" for 
Amendment Notes. — The 1994 amend- "fees" in the first sentence and "May 1,1995" for 
ment, effective May 2, 1994, in Subsection (1) "April 26, 1993" in the third sentence; and in 
deleted "or compiling a record in a form other Subsection (5)(a) added "except as permitted by 
than that maintained by the governmental en- Subsection (2Kb)." 
tity" from the end of the first sentence and The 1995 amendment, effective May 1, 1995, 
added the second sentence; added Subsections substituted "Section 63-38-3.2" for "Subsection 
(2) and (6), redesignating the other subsections 63-38-3(3)" in two places in Subsection (3)(a). 
63-2-204. Requests — Time limit for response and ex-
traordinary circumstances. 
(1) A person making a request for a record shall furnish the governmental 
entity with a written request containing his name, mailing address, daj^time 
telephone number, if available, and a description of the records requested that 
identifies the record with reasonable specificity. 
(2) A governmental entity may make rules in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, specifying where and to 
whom requests for access shall be directed. 
(3) (a) As soon as reasonably possible, but no later than ten business days 
after receiving a written request, or five business days after receiving a 
written request if the requester demonstrates that expedited response to 
the record request benefits the public rather than the person, the govern-
mental entity shall respond to the request by: 
(i) approving the request and providing the record; 
(ii) denying the request; 
(iii) notifying the requester that it does not maintain the record and 
providing, if known, the name and address of the governmental entity 
that does maintain the record; or 
(iv) notifying the requester that because of one of the extraordinary 
circumstances listed in Subsection (4), it cannot immediately approve 
or deny the request. The notice shall describe the circumstances relied 
upon and specify the date when the records will be available. 
(b) Any person who requests a record to obtain information for a story 
or report for publication or broadcast to the general public is presumed to 
be acting to benefit the public rather than a person. 
(4) The following circumstances constitute "extraordinary circumstances" 
that allow a governmental entity to delay approval or denial by an additional 
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63-2-802. Injunction — Attorneys' fees. 
(1) A district court in this state may enjoin any governmental entity or 
political subdivision that violates or proposes to violate the provisions of this 
chapter. 
(2) (a) A district court may assess against any governmental entity or 
political subdivision reasonable attorneys* fees and other litigation costs 
reasonably incurred in connection with a judicial appeal of a denial of a 
records request if the requester substantially prevails. 
(b) In determining whether to award attorneys' fees under this section, 
the court shall consider: 
(i) the public benefit derived from the case; 
(ii) the nature of the requester's interest in the records; and 
(iii) whether the governmental entity's or political subdivision's 
actions had a reasonable basis. 
(c) Attorneys' fees shall not ordinarily be awarded if the purpose of the 
litigation is primarily to benefit the requester's financial or commercial 
interest. 
(3) Neither attorneys' fees nor costs shall be awarded for fees or costs 
incurred during administrative proceedings. 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), a court may only award fees and costs 
incurred in connection with appeals to district courts under Subsection 
63-2-404(2) if the fees and costs were incurred 20 or more days after the 
requester provided to the governmental entity or political subdivision a 
statement of position that adequately explains the basis for the requester's 
position. 
(5) Claims for attorneys' fees as provided in this section or for damages are 
subject to Title 63, Chapter 30, Governmental Immunity Act. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-802, enacted by L. 
1991, eh. 259, § 39; 1992, ch. 280, § 47. 
63-2-803. No liability for certain decisions of a govern-
mental enti ty or a political subdivision. 
Neither the governmental entity or political subdivision, nor any officer or 
employee of the governmental entity or political subdivision, is liable for 
damages resulting from the release of a record where the person or govern-
ment requesting the record presented evidence of authority to obtain the 
record even if it is subsequently determined that the requester had no 
authority. 
History: C. 1953, 63-2-803, enacted by L. 
1991, ch. 259, § 40; 1992, ch. 280, § 48. 
63-2-804. Disciplinary action. 
A governmental entity or political subdivision may take disciplinary action 
which may include suspension or discharge against any employee of the 
governmental entity or political subdivision who intentionally violates any 
provision of this chapter. 
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President: Senate Bill 147. 
Clerk: Senate Bill 147 adequate funding for records request for Senator Dave Steele and 
the committee report February 7, 1994. Mr. President, the education committee 
reports favorable recommendation on Senate Bill 147 with a minimum sum page 
5 and 6 respectfully Howard A. Stevenson, Committee Chair. 
President: Senator Steele. 
Steele: Motion to adopt the committee report. 
President: Those in favor say aye. 
Senators: Aye. 
President: Opposed no. Motion carries. Senator Steele. 
Steele: Thank you, Mr. President. This body ought to be aware of a couple of GRAMA 
modifications that you'll be hearing this session. This is the first that I have. I 
have two of them. This relates to how much a government entity may recoup for 
their service of providing information records, what we believe to be appropriate 
and yet recognize that sometimes the request is fairly significant. 
Let me just give you an illustration. This is to a school district: "Description of 
records sought: documents relating to out-of-court and court-ordered civil 
settlements between the district, its agents, assigns and aggrieviated parties between 
June 1990 and September 1993." Think about that for just a moment, the amount 
of time that that would take, staff time to be involved in supplying that type of 
record information. Well, we're not trying to hide any records, and we're certainly 
not trying to make it so expensive that people can't participate in getting records, 
so that's the reason for this bill to see if we can clarify it a little bit. 
If you look with me on page 3 the first change, you'll see that it said "a requestor 
agrees to pay the government entity for its costs incurred in providing the record 
in the requested format in accordance with the fee section." So if you'd move with 
me from page 3 to page 5, this is the heart of the bill, the fee section. It has been 
amended and I'll need to walk with the amendment very quickly on the first line 
because we are running out of time. Page 5 line 2 after the word record the bill has 
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Senate Floor Debates, February 9, 1994. 
Senate tape 21, line 3405 
1 been amended to complete that sentence with a period so it reads: "A governmental 
2 entity may charge a reasonable fee to cover the governmental entity's actual costs 
3 of duplicating a record." Then that next language has been deleted and then 
4 reinserted "this fee shall be approved by the governmental entity's executive 
5 officer." So we don't want someone that is providing this information just to make 
6 an arbitrary decision that the record is going to cost so much. It needs to be 
7 reviewed by the appropriate governmental entity's executive. 
8 
9 Now, this new section 2: "When a governmental entity compiles a record in a form 
10 other than that normally maintained bv the governmental entity." So if we've made 
11 a change—it's not just the exact same form, we've asked them to modify that form— 
12 then this is what that section deals with. And it simply outiines that the cost of staff 
13 time for research could be incurred. If you look at line 13 notice "no charge may 
14 be made for the first quarter hour of staff time" in making this in a different form 
15 than is normally maintained. So we're giving that requestor an opportunity to 
16 access the governments ability to respond to the first 15 minutes of no charge. 
17 
18 I'd be happy to entertain any questions. I see Senator Oakey has one. 
19 
20 President: Senator Oakey. 
21 
22 Oakey: Thank you Mr. President. Senator Steele, I notice here on page 5 on line 17 it 
23 says "costs associated with building and maintaining the information system." 
24 Would that include the costs of the building and maintaining the information that's 
25 going to be put on this record that they're trying to access. 
26 
27 Steele: There are systems like the GIS system and networks of on-line services and so 
28 that's the process. Now that area both had some discussion and I have been 
29 waiting for some proposal of language to amend that and haven't seen that yet. 
30 I'm sure it's going to coming so I'm not in any hurry to move it forward without 
31 further input from some people. But yes, that database collection process is what 
32 we're addressing. 
33 
34 Oakey: Well, let me say that I think this is a major policy issue that we need to debate in 
35 the legislature. I have a bill which will set up an information network to be 
36 potentially called "Utah Net" and the bill will provide for the coordination of 
37 databases all throughout state government. One of the key issues in that bill is 
38 what is going to be the cost of providing access to these databases. The way the 
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1 Bill is going to read we thought would be to simply reference GRAMA. Because 
2 we really have got to decide whether we're going to try to cover more than just our 
3 actual out-of-pocket expense for delivering the information or whether we're going 
4 to actually charge people for the creation of the data which is going on throughout 
5 state government which the taxpayers have paid for in funding each agency. And 
6 I don't think we have addressed that question. I can tell you there's a national 
7 debate across this country on this very issue and we need to decide as a legislature 
8 whether we're going to charge people for the cost of creating the data which 
9 arguably they have already paid for in funding each of these agencies, their 
10 operational expenses in each annual appropriation or whether we're simply going 
11 to try to recover our actual costs of delivering the data to them either electronically 
12 or through some paper record and so I'm concerned about language in this bill that 
13 might make a decision for us that we haven't really focussed on. I think it's a 
14 major policy issue. The data we're talking about is created has cost I'm sure 
15 hundreds of millions or dollars and if we're going to try to recover all of that cost, 
16 then the taxpayers are going to get a big bill every time they try to access the 
17 information and I think we need to focus on that issue. I didn't realize it was 
18 coming up in this Bill but I'm a little concerned that the language in here is not 
19 precise. We'll open the door for that and personally I'm comfortable and I think 
20 the members of the Senate are willing to decide what we're willing to do. 
21 
22 Steele: I appreciate your sensitivity of this because it is a major issue. This isn't one that 
23 is glossed over and certainly the creation of GRAMA was done under a two year 
24 process with a great deal of debate so Senator Oakey's comments I would hope 
25 we'd all register because it is a direction of policy and a statement of policy. It is 
26 not unique. This language is taken exactly from the Colorado statute and we talked 
27 about that in our committee. And there is one other line of amendment that I could 
28 draw your attention to on line 21 and 22. The amendment causes the language to 
29 read this way "Governmental entities with fees established by the legislature" and 
30 notice who are establishing those "shall establish the fees defined in the subsection 
31 2" that's above the language that Senator Oakey was talking about "or the actual 
32 cost associated with this section." Again, then it is giving that review of the 
33 legislative process to these fees and charges. So it isn't done with a whimsical 
34 process; it would give the authority to this body of the legislature to be 
35 participatory. Now Senator, that language I just read was part of the amendment 
36 and you'd have to be reading from that amendment page to identify that as well, 
37 but I see that we're... 
38 
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1 Oakey: I have the amendment page here. 
2 
3 Steele: The day it came out with the Committee Report. 
4 
5 So, Mr. President, I notice that we're to noon if we just want to hold it over and 
6 discuss it further, I'm certainly welcome, happy to do that. 
7 
8 Oakey: I think we need to. I certainly would not feel comfortable voting for this bill until 
9 I know exactly what we're doing on this issue, because I think we're talking about 
10 millions, hundreds of millions of dollars here. 
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